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THE PRIVACY MERCHANTS:  WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
Amitai Etzioni* 
Rights have been long understood, first and foremost, as protection of the private from the public, 
the individual from the State.  True, we also recognize positive rights (such as socioeconomic 
rights) and the government’s duty to protect citizens from violations of rights by other actors besides 
the State.  However, when violations of privacy are discussed, the first violator that typically comes 
to mind is “Big Brother”—that is, the State.
1
 
This Article focuses on the growing threat to privacy from private actors, specifically profit-making 
corporations.  It briefly outlines a range of options aimed at protecting individual privacy against 
encroachment by private actors, and it evaluates them within the prevailing normative, legal, and 
political context in the United States. 
I.  CORPORATE SURVEILLANCE, TRACKING, DATA MINING, AND 
PROFILING 
Most informed citizens probably know by now that corporations 
collect information about them, but they may well be unaware of the 
extent and scope of the invasions of privacy that are now widespread.  
Many may be aware of tracking tools referred to as “cookies.”  Coo-
kies are installed on one’s computer by visited Web sites.  They are 
used to identify the person and to remember his or her preferences.  
Some people have learned to protect themselves from such tracking 
by employing software that allows one to clear cookies from one’s 
computer.  However, corporations have recently begun to install “su-
percookies” that are very difficult to detect and, if removed, secretly 
reinstall themselves.2  As one report concluded:  “This means that 
privacy-sensitive consumers who ‘toss’ their HTTP cookies to prevent 
 
 * I am indebted to Nathan Pippenger for research assistance on this Article and to Orin 
Kerr and Alex Platt for comments on a previous draft.  I also greatly benefited from dis-
cussions with Gina Stevens. 
 1 See, e.g., SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS:  THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE 2 
(2010) (identifying the “little-known and little-understood band of mavericks who’ve 
spent most of their careers working in the intelligence and national security agencies of 
the government”). 
 2 See Julia Angwin, Latest in Web Tracking:  Stealthy ‘Supercookies,’ WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903480904576508382675931492.html 
(citing cookies used through Flash software as an example of this practice). 
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tracking or remain anonymous are still being uniquely identified on-
line by advertising companies.”3 
Major cell phone and mobile technology companies offer services 
that allow lovers, ex-spouses, lawyers, or anyone else to find out where 
a person is—and track their movements—by using the GPS capabili-
ties of their cell phones.4  A German politician who inquired about 
location storage information discovered that over a six-month period, 
his longitude and latitude had been recorded over 35,000 times.5 
There are two kinds of corporations that keep track of what Inter-
net users buy, read, visit, and drink, and who they call, e-mail, date, 
and much else.  Some merely track users’ activity on their sites as part 
of their regular business; recording purchases and viewed products 
helps them increase sales.  This is true for nearly every major online 
retailer.  Other corporations make shadowing Internet users—and 
keeping very detailed dossiers on them—their main line of business.  
One can call these the “Privacy Merchants.”  They sell information to 
whoever pays the required price.  In 2005, one such company—
Choicepoint—had records on over 220 million people.6  Professor 
Christopher Slobogin notes that the amount of information culled by 
corporate data miners 
can provide the inquirer with a wide array of data about any of us, includ-
ing basic demographic information, income, net worth, real property 
holdings, social security number, current and previous addresses, phone 
numbers and fax numbers, names of neighbors, driver records, license 
plate and VIN numbers, bankruptcy and debtor filings, employment, 
business and criminal records, bank account balances and activity, stock 
purchases, and credit card activity.7 
In 2009, a law professor at Fordham University gained minor notorie-
ty when he assigned his class to create a dossier on Justice Antonin 
 
 3 Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 2 (Summer Undergraduate Program in En-
gineering Research at Berkeley, Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1446862 (describing how Flash 
cookies operate). 
 4 See Justin Scheck, Stalkers Exploit Cellphone GPS, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703467304575383522318244234.html 
(reporting how GPS systems “have unexpectedly made it easier for abusers to track their 
victims”). 
 5 Noam Cohen, It’s Tracking Your Every Move, and You May Not Even Know, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2011, at A1 (noting that Deutsche Telekom “traced him from a train on the way to Er-
langen at the start through to that last night, when he was home in Berlin”). 
 6 They’re Watching You, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005 (book review), http://www.businessweek.
com/magazine/content/05_04/b3917056_mz005.htm. 
 7 Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317, 320 (2008) (describing how the government “routinely makes use” of these 
“commercial data brokers”). 
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Scalia using only the information they could find online—resulting in 
a fifteen-page file “that included the justice’s home address and 
home phone number, his wife’s personal e-mail address and the TV 
shows and food he prefers.”8  Some Privacy Merchants even keep dos-
siers on a person’s marital status and political leanings, as well as in-
terests in topics including religion, the Bible, gambling, and adult en-
tertainment.9 
Although several data-mining companies allow individuals to opt 
out of their databases, each separate company must be contacted in-
dividually, and even then information may still linger in some search 
results or Web sites.  Google, for example, generally does not remove 
search results if the information contained is truthful and not illeg-
al.10 
Privacy Merchants are limited by laws Congress (and states) have 
enacted that carve out subsets of data that they cannot freely trade in, 
especially medical and financial records.  So far though, very little at-
tention has been paid to the fact that information is fungible.  
Through a process that might be called “privacy violating triangula-
tion” (“PVT”), one can readily derive much about a person’s medical, 
financial, or other protected private side by using “innocent facts” not 
privileged by law.  A piece of seemingly benign information—for in-
stance, the number of days a person failed to show up for work, or if 
the person made special purchases, such as a wig—suggests volumes 
about one’s medical condition.  By building a portfolio of many such 
apparently innocuous facts, one could infer a great deal, effectively 
violating the realm of privacy surrounding individuals’ most sensitive 
information.  Thus, a study of Facebook shows “how the on-line social 
network data could be used to predict some individual private trait 
that a user is not willing to disclose (e.g. political or religious affilia-
tion).”11  This will be discussed in further detail below. 
Some individuals may think that they can protect themselves from 
tracking and dossiers by using pseudonyms and multiple “mailboxes.”  
 
 8 Noam Cohen, Law Students Teach Scalia About Privacy and the Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 
2009, at B3. 
 9 See Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer Profiles Users By Name, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304410504575560243259416072.html 
(profiling the online tracking company RapLeaf, Inc.). 
 10 See Riva Richmond, How to Fix (Or Kill) Web Data About You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at 
B6 (explaining Google’s policy for removing information from its search engines). 
 11 Jack Lindamood et al., Inferring Private Information Using Social Network Data, Presen-
tation at the 18th International World Wide Web Conference, Madrid (Apr. 20–24, 
2009), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/~muratk/publications/www09pp242-
lindamood.pdf. 
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However, some companies have developed software to match pseu-
donyms used on message boards and blogs with real names and per-
sonal e-mail addresses.12  The subjects of this tracking, who are una-
ware that their anonymity has been stripped, include people who use 
online pseudonyms to discuss sensitive topics like mental illness.13  As 
Eli Pariser reports, “[s]earch for a word like ‘depression’ on Dictio-
nary.com, and the site installs up to 223 tracking cookies and beacons 
on your computer so that other Web sites can target you with antide-
pressants.”14  It should be noted that the privacy of medical records is 
protected by law, but “visits” to medical Web sites or chat groups are 
not. 
Many companies claim that they do not collect names or that they 
disassociate names from dossiers.  However, some companies keep a 
database of names on file.  One such company, RapLeaf, states that it 
does not share its subjects’ names with advertisers, but an investiga-
tion found that it does link those names to “extraordinarily intimate 
databases . . . by tapping voter-registration files, shopping histories, 
social-networking activities and real estate records . . . .”15  And al-
though the company indeed refrains from specifically sharing names 
with its clients, it did share personally identifiable information with 
them, such as unique Facebook account numbers that can be traced 
back to the account holder’s name.16 
Privacy advocates have sharply objected to the government’s use 
of deep packet inspection (“DPI”)—a powerful tool used to analyze 
the contents of communications transmitted over the Internet—in 
large part because it is much more intrusive than merely tracking 
who is communicating with whom.  (The difference is akin to reading 
letters versus examining the outside of an envelope to see who sent 
the letter and to whom it is addressed.)  Now private companies are 
offering to perform DPI for Internet Service Providers to facilitate 
targeted advertising.17 
 
 12 Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, ‘Scrapers’ Dig Deep for Data on Web, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 
2010, at A1 (describing software that “matches people’s real names to the pseudonyms 
they use on blogs, Twitter, and other social networks”). 
 13 See id. (describing a forum in which “people exchange highly personal stories about their 
emotional disorders, ranging from bipolar disease to a desire to cut themselves”). 
 14 Eli Pariser, What the Internet Knows About You, CNN (May 22, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-22/opinion/pariser.filter.bubble. 
 15 Steel, supra note 9. 
 16 Id.  
 17 Steve Stecklow & Paul Sonne, Shunned Profiling Method on the Verge of Comeback, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 24, 2010, at A1. 
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In 2010, Facebook became the most-visited Web site in the United 
States,18 nearing 700 million users in June 2011.19  Facebook users put 
great amounts of personal information on their individual profiles, 
including their religious and political views, educational and profes-
sional background, and interests, as well as photos and videos of 
themselves.  Most importantly, unlike most other Web sites where in-
dividuals employ usernames or pseudonyms, Facebook is designed 
for people to use their real names.  This makes it vastly more valuable 
to data miners who seek to gather personally identifiable information 
in order to assemble dossiers on the individuals.  Furthermore, each 
individual’s profile is linked to the profiles of his or her “friends,” 
who may have different privacy settings allowing for broader access to 
shared data, such as photographs or group membership, than the in-
dividual chooses to exhibit on his or her own profile. 
Facebook provides customizable privacy tools and some privacy 
protection, but it has faced consistent criticism that those protections 
are difficult to manipulate.20  As Facebook has introduced third-party 
applications (such as games) to its site, it has faced mounting difficul-
ties in keeping its end of the bargain. 
In a July 2010 letter to Representative John Conyers of the U.S. 
House Judiciary Committee, a Facebook official stated that  
the question posed in your letter asks whether Facebook shares users’ 
personal information with third parties without the knowledge of users 
. . . . The answer is simple and straightforward:  we do not.  We have de-
signed our system and policies so that user information is never shared 
without our users’ knowledge.21   
It was a few months later, in October 2010, that the Wall Street Journal 
broke the story of extensive user privacy breaches by Facebook.22  It 
discovered that popular Facebook applications were “providing access 
to people’s names and, in some cases, their friends’ names” to Inter-
net tracking companies.23  According to the Journal, the breach af-
 
 18 Jessica Guynn, T. Rowe Price Invests in Facebook, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/04/t-rowe-price-invests-in-facebook.
html. 
 19 Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, Facebook:  700,000,000, BUS. INSIDER (May 31, 2011, 3:08 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-700-million-2011-5. 
 20 Facebook Faces Criticism on Privacy Change, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2009, 10:09 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/8405334.stm. 
 21 Juliana Gruenwald, Facebook Defends Privacy Policies, NAT. J. SUBSCRIBER (July 27, 2010), 
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/07/facebook-defends-privacy-polic.php 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22 See Emily Steel & Geoffrey Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2010, at 
A1(investigating Facebook apps and their unauthorized transfer of private user data). 
 23 Id. 
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fected “tens of millions” of users—including those who were vigilant 
in setting their privacy protections—and was in violation of Face-
book’s stated policies.24  In the same month, the New York Times re-
ported on two studies that found that “in certain circumstances, ad-
vertisers—or snoops posing as advertisers [on Facebook]—may be 
able to learn sensitive profile information, like a person’s sexual 
orientation or religion, even if the person is sharing that information 
only with a small circle of friends.”25 
In addition, the nearly ubiquitous Facebook “Like” button and 
Twitter “Tweet” button on Web sites “notify Facebook and Twitter 
that a person visited those sites even when users don’t click on the 
buttons.”26  These widgets have been added to millions of Web pages 
and they appear on more than one-third of the world’s top 1000 Web 
sites—allowing sites with those widgets to track specific Facebook us-
ers.27  The tracking (which is used for targeted advertising) continues 
until the user specifically logs out of his or her account, even if the 
user turns off the computer.28 
One may argue that the private sector merely uses this informa-
tion for commercial purposes, while the government may use it to jail 
people, suppress free speech, and otherwise violate their rights.  
However, one must note that the violation of privacy by private agents 
has some similar effects to violations committed by government 
agents—effects that lead to discrimination and “chilling” of expres-
sion and dissent.  Thus, when gay people who seek to keep their sex-
ual orientation private are “outed” by the media, or banks call in 
loans of those they find out have cancer, or employers refuse to hire 
people because they learn about their political or religious views, pri-
vacy is violated in a manner about as consequential as if the same vi-
olations had been carried out by a government agency. 
II.  PRIVACY MERCHANTS IN THE SERVICE OF BIG BROTHER 
Even if one disregards the facts already cited, which show that 
corporate violations of privacy are far-reaching and chilling, one must 
note that the information corporations amass is available to the gov-
ernment.  Laws may prevent the government from ordering a private 
 
 24 See id. (“Facebook prohibits app makers from transferring data about users to outside ad-
vertising and data companies, even if a user agrees”). 
 25 Miguel Helft, Marketers Can Glean Private Data on Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at B1. 
 26 Amir Efrati, ‘Like’ Button Follows Web Users, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2011, at B1. 
 27 See id. (evaluating a study by former Google engineer, Brian Kennish, of the 1000 most 
popular Web sites). 
 28 See id. at B2 (concluding that widgets are a powerful way to track Internet users). 
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company to conduct surveillance on innocent citizens not suspected 
of anything or from generating dossiers that the government itself is 
banned from generating (in other words, when corporations act as 
government agents, they may be subject to the same or similar limita-
tions by which the government must abide).  However, the govern-
ment can and does use data already amassed by Privacy Merchants for 
their own sake.  Nor do prevailing laws prevent private corporations 
from analyzing online activity with an eye towards the government’s 
needs and shaping their privacy-violating data in ways to make them 
more attractive to government purchasers of their services.  Indeed, 
because the government is such a large and reliable client, corporate 
databanks have a strong financial interest in anticipating its needs.  
The thesis that what is private does not stay private is far from hypo-
thetical.  As Chris Hoofnagle notes, even though Congress limited 
the executive branch’s amassing of personal information in the 1974 
Privacy Act, “those protections have failed to meet Congress’ [sic] in-
tent because the private sector has done what the government has 
been prohibited from doing.”29 
According to Daniel Solove, “for quite some time, the government 
has been increasingly contracting with businesses to acquire databas-
es of personal information.  Database firms are willing to supply the 
information and the government is willing to pay for it.”30  Solove 
points out that the government can “find out details about people’s 
race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health, lifestyle, and purchas-
ing habits from the database companies that keep extensive personal 
information on millions of Americans.”31 
Hoofnagle similarly warns that “[p]rivate sector commercial data 
brokers have built massive data centers with personal information 
custom-tailored to law enforcement agents.”32  ChoicePoint, a major 
Privacy Merchant, has at least thirty-five contracts with government 
agencies, including the Department of Justice (through which it pro-
vides its databases to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”)), as 
well as the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), the Internal 
 
 29 Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers:  How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data 
Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
595, 636 (2004). 
 30 DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 169 (2004). 
 31 Id. at 167. 
 32 Hoofnagle, supra note 29, at 636–37. 
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Revenue Service (“IRS”), and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services.33 
Another corporate data miner, Florida-based SeisInt, ran a mas-
sive database called MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Informa-
tion Exchange) in a joint effort among several U.S. states to coordi-
nate counterterrorism efforts.34  The federal government paid $12 
million to support the program, which SeisInt developed with exten-
sive amounts of data, including individuals’ “criminal histories, pho-
tographs, property ownership, SSNs, addresses, bankruptcies, family 
members, and credit information.”35  Even before the 9/11 attacks, 
the U.S. Marshals Service alone performed up to 40,000 searches 
every month using private databanks.36  The exact number of con-
tracts the government has made with corporate data miners is un-
known because many of the contracts are classified.37  However, one 
2006 government study found that at least fifty-two federal agencies 
had launched—or were planning to launch at the time of the study—
at least 199 data mining projects that rely on the services and tech-
nology of commercial databanks.38 
Other government tracking and surveillance efforts have relied on 
private corporations.  In 2006, it was disclosed that three major tele-
communications providers, AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth, had coo-
perated with the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to provide it with 
the phone call records of “tens of millions of Americans”—a program 
which, according to one source, was “the largest database ever assem-
bled in the world.”39  The companies, which agreed to work with the 
NSA, provide phone service to over 200 million Americans, leading 
the program significantly closer to its ultimate goal:  creating a data-
 
 33 Jay Stanley, The Surveillance-Industrial Complex:  How the American Government Is Conscripting 
Businesses and Individuals in the Construction of a Surveillance Society, 26 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION (2004), http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/surveillance_report.pdf (discussing gov-
ernment customers’ large contracts with data companies). 
 34 SOLOVE, supra note 30, at 170. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Slobogin, supra note 7, at 320 (highlighting the variety of data available in these banks 
including demographic information, net worth, employment and criminal records, and 
credit card activity). 
 37 Arshad Mohammed & Sara Kehaulani Goo, Government Increasingly Turning to Data Min-
ing, WASH. POST, June 15, 2006, at D3, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/14/AR2006061402063.html (“It is difficult to pinpoint the 
number of such contracts because many of them are classified . . . .”). 
 38 See id.  
 39 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 
2006, at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-
nsa_x.htm (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Mar. 2012] THE PRIVACY MERCHANTS 937 
 
base of every phone call made within the United States.40  Other gov-
ernment projects relying on private sources include efforts by Ho-
meland Security to secure air travel and the nation’s borders and a 
Pentagon program which collects data on teenagers to better target 
military recruitment efforts.41 
Moreover, the trend is to extend this use, as evidenced by a 2011 
FBI manual that enables agents to search for private citizens in com-
mercial databases without prior authorization or even notification.42  
In 2011, Google revealed that the U.S. government made the most 
requests for Internet users’ private data in 2010, with Google comply-
ing with 94% of those orders.43 
One may well hold that some of the usages of private databanks by 
the government serve legitimate purposes, even if they are loaded 
with extensive dossiers on most adult Americans, rather than those 
for which there is some evidence or reason to suspect that they are 
violating the law.  However, one must still note that from here on, 
whether such databanks are in the FBI headquarters or in some cor-
porate office matters little.  At most, they are just a click—and a pay-
ment—away. 
The next segment of this Article outlines differing approaches to 
the protection of privacy in the new world in which the traditional 
distinction between public and private realms (on which many nor-
mative and legal conceptions build, in particular those that concern 
privacy) are much less important and are becoming still less signifi-
cant.  The new amalgamated social world calls for cross-realm or ho-
listic modes of deliberations and policy-making. 
III.  THE MAIN ALTERNATIVES 
The following deliberations draw on my sociological training and 
normative considerations and not on any legal preparation.  I merely 
chart the “big picture” because—as will become clear shortly—most, 
if not all, of the alternatives face major hurdles.  It therefore seems 
premature to spell out any of the alternative approaches before strat-
egies and political forces are developed that will make it possible to 
 
 40 See id.  
 41 Mohammed & Goo, supra note 37 (discussing the increase in federal government spend-
ing for personal data within the private sector). 
 42 Charlie Savage, FBI Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at 
A1 (“The new rules add to several measures taken over the past decade to give agents 
more latitude . . . .”). 
 43 Transparency Report, GOOGLE (Jan. 2012) http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
governmentrequests/userdata/?p=2010-12. 
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overcome these hurdles.  The alternatives are evaluated, not on the 
basis of what would best protect privacy from Privacy Merchants, but 
on which measures might be taken in the prevailing context in the 
United States. 
A.  Change the Norm:  A World Without Privacy? 
One major response to Privacy Merchants’ expanding reach has 
been well encapsulated by the CEO of Sun Microsystems, Scott 
McNealy, who stated:  “You have zero privacy . . . . Get over it.”44  Fa-
cebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, argues that social norms under-
girding privacy law are obsolete.45  That is, instead of finding new ways 
to protect individuals from corporations, individuals should learn to 
accept changed—in effect, much lower—levels of privacy.  He elabo-
rated:  “People have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more 
information and different kinds, but more openly and with more 
people . . . . That social norm is just something that has evolved over 
time.”46  Zuckerberg continued:  “We view it as our role in the system 
to constantly be innovating and be updating what our system is to re-
flect what the current social norms are.”47  He thus implies that the 
Privacy Merchants are not undermining the norm but merely ac-
commodating their wares to already-in-place changes in norms. 
As I see it, it is true that the privacy norms are eroding due to fac-
tors other than the corporate drive to use private information for 
profit-making, evidenced by people going on talk shows to reveal 
much about themselves, a form of exhibitionism.  However, there can 
be little doubt that corporations, especially the new social media, led 
by Facebook, are aiding and abetting and seeking to legitimize the 
erosion of privacy. 
The Wall Street Journal editorial page, which reflects that publica-
tion’s philosophy, argues that the change in norms indicates that the 
introduction of new laws or regulations to better protect privacy is 
 
 44 Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy:  ‘Get Over It,’ WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
 45 See Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
10, 2010, 8:58 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-
privacy (“The rise of social networking online means that people no longer have an ex-
pectation of privacy, according to Facebook founder, Mark Zuckerberg.”). 
 46 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47 Ian Paul, Facebook CEO Challenges the Social Norm of Privacy, PCWORLD (Jan. 11, 2010, 10:03 
AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/186584/facebook_ceo_challenges_the_social_
norm_of_privacy.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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not called for.48  L. Gordon Crovitz pointed out that, as of March 
2011, more than half of Americans over age twelve have Facebook ac-
counts.49  He proceeded to ask:  “If most Americans are happy to have 
Facebook accounts, knowingly trading personal information for other 
benefits, why is Washington so focused on new privacy laws?  There is 
little evidence that people want new rules.”50 
Furthermore, Crovitz argues, consumers value the benefits of in-
formation gathering, including better-targeted ads, specific recom-
mendations for customers, and huge troves of data for research (such 
as in Google Flu Trends, which tracks search terms about illnesses to 
assist epidemiologists).  “People are increasingly at ease with sharing 
personal data in exchange for other benefits,” he argues.51 
Some public opinion polls, including recent ones, show that the 
American people care a great deal about their privacy.  Others show 
that various segments of the public vary in the way they feel about this 
right.  For example, according to a 2009 survey, 73% to 86% of Amer-
icans object to the tracking methods used to personalize their adver-
tisements.52  Furthermore, the study found that 82% of young 
people—who are generally believed to be apathetic about privacy—
had at some point refused to provide information to a company be-
cause it was too personal.53  Eighty-six percent of Americans—84% 
among respondents aged eighteen to twenty-four—felt that their 
permission should be sought before pictures of them were posted on-
line.54 
Other data reveal a more varied picture.  In a 1995 survey, Alan 
Westin divided the public into three “camps” over privacy concerns.55  
About 25% of respondents were “Privacy Fundamentalists,” who value 
privacy especially highly; 55% were “Privacy Pragmatists,” who adjust 
 
 48 L. Gordon Crovitz, The 0.00002% Privacy Solution, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2011, at A15  
(“There is little evidence that people want new rules.”). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It, U. 
PA. SCHOLARLYCOMMONS, at 14–15 (Sept. 1, 2009), http://repository.upenn.edu/
asc_papers/137. 
 53 Chris J. Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to 
Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 10 (Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Alan Westin, “Whatever Works:”  The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation and Self-
Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, in NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., PRIVACY AND 
SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE ch. 1, § F, at 52–53 (1997), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfreg1.htm#1F. 
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their expectations based on the relative value of information types 
and trust in specific companies; and 20% were “Privacy Uncon-
cerned,” who have no problem with giving out personal informa-
tion.56 
A 2002 study found that while 70% of consumers were concerned 
about their privacy, 82% were willing to give out personal informa-
tion in exchange for the chance to win a hundred dollars in a sweeps-
takes.57  The rise in popularity of location-tracking social networking 
sites such as Foursquare, Facebook Places, and Gowalla, which offer 
discounts to users who log visits to various businesses and restaurants, 
suggests that people are indeed willing to trade information once 
considered private (their locations and consumption habits) for cer-
tain benefits.  According to one survey, the coupon reward systems on 
these sites were the main incentive for users to join.58 
One must, though, take into account that it is very likely that 
those who have relatively little concern about privacy are unaware 
that their less sensitive information can be used for PVT, and that 
privacy is a right, not subject to majority rule.  Even if only a minority 
cherishes it, it is still a birthright of all Americans. 
B.  The Self-Regulation Option 
The prevailing system in the United States—and the de facto pre-
vailing system in the Eurpoean Union—relies to a significant extent 
on self-regulation and individual choice, that is, the assumption that 
consumers will choose the services and products of those corpora-
tions that protect privacy at the level the consumers seek and that us-
ers can set their privacy controls to the level they prefer.  And that, as 
a result, corporations that provide less privacy protection than the 
public seeks will lose business and be incentivized to enhance their 
privacy protection.  Additionally, some scholars have argued that 
marketing in this vein is protected as free speech under the First 
Amendment, an argument not addressed in this Article.59  These 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report:  Everybody Talks About Online Privacy, but Few Do Anything 
About It, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at C6. 
 58 Matt Carmichael, What Consumers Want from Brands Online, ADVERTISING AGE (Feb. 27, 
2011), http://adage.com/article/digital/consumers-seek-brand-discounts-facebook-
preferred-platform/149095 (discussing coupons as the “main driver listed for users of lo-
cation-based check-in services”). 
 59 For further discussion, see A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461 (2000), and also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:  The Troub-
ling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 
(2000). 
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ideas are founded on the standard libertarian argument, as noted by 
Susanna Kim Ripken:  “Respect for individual autonomy, responsibili-
ty, and decision-making is deeply entrenched in our culture and law.  
We believe that people can order their own economic affairs and, 
given sufficient information, can make their own personal assess-
ments of the risks and benefits of transactions.”60 
None of these assumptions withstand sociological scrutiny. The thesis 
that consumers are rational actors who make decisions in their best 
interests, in line with their personal preferences and available infor-
mation, has been disproven beyond reasonable doubt by the studies 
of behavioral economists.61  For this very reason, transparency does 
not work.  That is, the suggestion that if corporations simply declare 
what their privacy standards are, consumers could choose those that 
suit them, is erroneous if not misleading.  The statements are written 
in legalese, in terms few can penetrate; the privacy settings provided 
are complex, cumbersome, and frequently revised—after the users 
have posted information on the site that they cannot erase. 
Furthermore, without regulation, there is no assurance that cor-
porations will adhere to their privacy declarations, or at least to their 
implied promise.62  This does not refer necessarily to outright false 
statements, but to carefully crafted yet misleading commitments to 
privacy that end up entrapping the consumer.  For instance, after 
public outcry over the iPhone’s hidden location tracking, Apple re-
leased a statement denying that they tracked users’ locations; rather, 
they maintained “a database of WiFi hot spots and cell phone towers 
around your current location . . . .”63  As Mark Rotenberg of the Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) pointed out, this data-
base is precisely how the company tracks locations, even if it is not 
tracking the device itself.64  A study by DoubleVerify surveyed five bil-
lion advertisements and found that an icon explaining the privacy 
policy was clicked on only 0.002% of the time—and even then, after 
 
 60 Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:  Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 195–96 (2006) (foot-
note omitted). 
 61 For further discussion on this subject, see Dan Ariely, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL:  THE 
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 243 (2008). 
 62 Chris Hoofnagle, Can Privacy Self-Regulation Work for Consumers?, TECH. ACADS. POL’Y (Jan. 
26, 2011), http://www.techpolicy.com/CanPrivacySelf-RegulationWork-Hoofnagle.aspx 
(providing examples of organizations that failed to abide by their own privacy policies). 
 63 Apple Q&A on Location Data, APPLE PRESS INFO (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html. 
 64 Adam Satariano and Katie Hoffmann, Apple Denies Tracking iPhone Locations, Will Update 
Software, BLOOMBERG, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-
27/apple-denies-tracking-iphone-locations-will-reduce-data-storage-capacity.html. 
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users reviewed the advertisers’ information practices, only 1% opted 
out of the targeted advertising.65  “That’s an opt out rate of just 
0.00002%,” Crovitz notes.66  “People seem to have adjusted to this new 
technology faster than regulators are willing to admit.”67  Crovitz ar-
gues that the fact that few consumers read these statements shows 
they do not care; in actuality, data already cited strongly suggest that 
they do not read them because they find them impenetrable.68  
Another national survey found that 57% of adult Americans were un-
der the false impression that if a Web site merely had a privacy policy, 
then it would not share their information with other companies.69  
Moreover, individuals cannot protect themselves from corporations 
that employ covert tools such as Flash cookies, supercookies, and 
widgets. 
Large corporations—which do business in all fifty states, as well as 
overseas—find it in their interest to promote regulation that would 
provide some modicum of privacy.  This is the case because such cor-
porations incur considerable costs when they have to adjust their way 
of doing business to different state laws, and deal differently in vari-
ous segments of the market—some of which are more regulated than 
others under the current patchwork of privacy laws. 
Hence some large corporations once opposed to legislation now 
favor a federal omnibus privacy law that would simplify the patchwork 
of federal sector-specific laws and preempt state specific statutes.  A 
Microsoft white paper from 2005 advised, “[F]ederal privacy legisla-
tion should pre-empt state laws that impose requirements for the col-
lection, use, disclosure, and storage of personal information.”70  Such 
a law would likely set standards and ceilings (for instance, caps on 
damages for privacy violations), which states could not exceed.  State 
laws demanding higher privacy standards than a federally mandated 
norm would be invalidated, or at least weakened significantly.  In-
deed, it seems they would accept only legislation that included 
 
 65 Crovitz, supra note 48. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues Privacy Report, Offers Framework for 
Consumers, Bussinesses and Policymakers (Dec. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/12/privacyreport.shtm (“Although many companies use 
privacy policies to explain their information practices, the policies have become long, le-
galistic disclosures that consumers usually don’t read and don’t understand if they do.”). 
 69 Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy:  The System Is Broken, in ANNENBERG PUBLIC 
POLICY CENTER REPORT (2003), available at http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/jturow/
internet-privacy-report/36-page-turow-version-9.pdf. 
 70 Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 921 (2009) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
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preemption.  Former CEO of eBay, Meg Whitman explicitly testified 
before Congress, “Legislation without preemption would make the 
current situation possibly worse, not better, by creating additional 
uncertainty and compliance burdens.”71 
The ideal legislation, for Microsoft and similar entities, would 
provide “baseline privacy protection” over which companies would be 
encouraged to “compete on the basis of more robust privacy practic-
es”72—to essentially regulate themselves.  According to Microsoft 
Deputy General Counsel Erich Anderson’s testimony before Con-
gress, a federal law should be crafted only as “an effective complement 
to” self-regulation.73 
State and sectoral laws have already addressed a number of privacy 
issues (e.g. setting limits on tracking consumers for targeted advertis-
ing74) while Congress has been largely inactive in this area.75  Hence, 
following a course of self-regulation would in effect reduce privacy 
standards in those states that lifted them and may prevent them from 
adding protections in the future.76  Moreover, the corporate proposal 
does involve some federal legislation rather than merely relying on 
self-regulation.  Indeed, it seems impossible to restrain the Privacy 
Merchants without calling in Big Brother. 
C.  Consent for Secondary Use:  Opt in Rather than Out? 
A rather different approach holds that individuals who release in-
formation about themselves for a specific purpose or transaction, for 
example to purchase a book from Amazon, would be understood to 
still “own” this information, and that Amazon could use it for other 
purposes (or sell that information to other parties) only with the ex-
plicit consent of the consumer (rather than on the basis of a privacy 
statement on its Web sites or presumed consent).  The same idea is 
referred to in other words, namely that consumers would have to opt 
in to grant secondary and additional use of private information ra-
 
 71 Id. at 929 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72 The Need for a Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Consumer Privacy:  Hearing on the State of 
Online Consumer Privacy Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 112th Cong. 6 
(2011) (statement of Erich Anderson, Deputy General Counsel, Microsoft Corporation). 
 73 See id. at 5. 
 74 Raised B. 5765, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Session. (Conn. 2008). 
 75 See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 946 (“In contrast, federal sectoral privacy law presents a 
more complicated situation.”). 
 76 Hoofnagle, supra note 62. 
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ther than opt out.77  In American discourse, the term “owned” is used 
because information is treated as property and private information as 
private property.  In Europe, the same idea is embraced; however, 
privacy is treated more as an individual right—as part of the person-
hood—which is violated when one’s private sphere is violated. 
In 1995, in an effort to establish minimum protections for Inter-
net user privacy and establish a baseline consistency among the data 
protection laws of European Union (“EU”) member states, the Euro-
pean Council issued what is commonly called the “Data Protection 
Directive.”  The Directive, which scholars have called “aggressive”78 
and “extraordinarily comprehensive,”79 took effect in October 1998.  
Based on a legal tradition that “expressly recognizes the fundamental 
right to the protection of personal data,”80 the Directive is credited 
with having established the most influential and prominent data pro-
tections in the world to date.81  However, it has proven difficult to en-
sure compliance in those countries governed by the Directive.  Al-
though the law set out ambitious goals for the standardization of 
privacy protection in Europe, it has been hampered from the start by 
significant gaps in member states’ compliance and enforcement.  Ac-
cording to one observer, “[a]lthough the EU Data Privacy Directive 
has been approved by the EU itself, it is not self-implementing.  Be-
fore taking effect in individual nations, each of the fifteen EU mem-
ber countries must pass its own implementing legislation.  As of the 
effective date, only five had done so.”82 
The Directive requires that personal data be processed “only with 
the consent of the data subject,”83 with limited exceptions carved out 
 
 77 See Julie E. Cohen, Information Rights and Intellectual Freedom, in ETHICS AND THE INTERNET 
11, 11–32 (Anton Vedder ed., 2001) (discussing consent-based approaches to privacy and 
information “ownership”). 
 78 Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 
462 (2000). 
 79 FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 36 (1997). 
 80 Background:  EU Data Protection Directive, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://epic.org/privacy/intl/eu_data_protection_directive.html (last visited Jan. 23, 
2012). 
 81 Erica Newland, CDT Comments on EU Data Protection Directive, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & 
TECH. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/erica-newland/cdt-comments-eu-data-
protection-directive (calling the Directive “the most influential privacy framework in the 
world”); see also Comments of the Center For Democracy and Technology to the European Commis-
sion in the Matter of Consultation on the Commission’s Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data 
Protection in the European Union, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 7, (2011), 
http://cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_DPD_Comments.pdf (noting the “very strong top-level 
principles embodied in the Directive”). 
 82 Fromholz, supra note 78, at 467–68. 
 83 CATE, supra note 79, at 37. 
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for national security, law enforcement, and some basic state functions 
such as taxation.84  The intentionally broad language of the Directive 
includes—but is not limited to—such actions as collecting, storing, 
recording, adapting, retrieving, and erasing data;85 and “data” itself is 
defined broadly enough to include not just text, but also photo-
graphs, video, and sound.86  Its restrictions recognize that certain 
kinds of data are particularly sensitive and vulnerable to abuse; thus, 
it contains heightened restrictions on the processing of data which 
would reveal the subject’s personal traits, such as race, ethnicity, reli-
gious beliefs, or health background.  In most cases, collecting and 
passing on these kinds of information require the subject’s written 
consent, or they cannot be processed.87 
The law also requires a degree of transparency:  data processors 
must disclose to subjects of processing the ways in which they intend 
to use the data.88  Finally, in one of the Directive’s most restrictive and 
controversial portions, the drafters attempted to address the “border-
less” nature of the Internet and the likelihood that user data could be 
processed in or transmitted to countries not subject to the law’s pro-
tections.  To protect against this vulnerability, the Directive contains a 
provision requiring member states to prohibit the transfer of data to 
third countries that have not adopted an “adequate level of protec-
tion” for personal data.89  However as we have seen, implementing 
these protections has proven difficult, and enforcement across Eu-
rope has, at best, proven inconsistent. 
According to a 2011 report from the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, “although it is comprehensive in many ways, the [EU] 
Data Protection Directive has significant weaknesses.  Erratic en-
forcement and uneven implementation have left consumers and in-
dustry confused as to how the Directive’s principles apply to emerg-
ing practices.”90  In 2011, various EU authorities called for new, 
stronger privacy protection measures, especially in response to Face-
 
 84 See id. (noting that other exemptions allowing for the processing of personal data include 
monetary and budgetary considerations for a Member State of the EU or the EU itself). 
 85 Id. at 36. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. at 37 (“Personal data may be used only for the legitimate purpose for which they 
were collected . . . . The processing of data . . . is severely restricted and in most cases for-
bidden without the written permission of the data subject.”). 
 88 See id. (discussing the requirements of processing personal data in compliance with na-
tional laws). 
 89 Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Interest, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 431, 437 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90 Newland, supra note 81. 
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book; however, so far those have not been translated into new laws or 
regulations, not to mention enforcement. 
Limiting the involuntary secondary use of private information is 
much more popular in Europe than in the United States, as evi-
denced by the Directives enacted relatively early in the Internet’s li-
fespan, while a comprehensive American approach has yet to be arti-
culated.  However, the differences between the American and European ap-
approaches are much less pronounced than they may first seem.  This is the 
case because:  (a) Europeans do allow involuntary secondary use for a 
variety of purposes, including national security, prevention of crimi-
nal activity, journalistic freedom of speech, and personal use (for in-
stance, an address book);91 (b) the United States has set limits on a 
variety of secondary use of what might be called “sensitive informa-
tion;” and (c) what is called a “compliance gap”—that is, a gap be-
tween what is mandated by European laws and the extent to which 
the various governments enforce these laws.92  The EU’s privacy pro-
tections suffer from this gap. 
The ban on involuntary secondary use burdens the consumers, 
who have limited capacity to evaluate various privacy statements and 
assurances that these are indeed heeded.  They are unaware of the 
risks of PVT.  And business lobbies tend to strenuously oppose this 
approach, which makes it very unlikely to be enacted in the United 
States or heeded in Europe.  And differences in laws and enforce-
ment levels among countries—across whose borders the same infor-
mation readily flows—greatly limit the value of this way of better pro-
tecting privacy from private invasions. 
D.  Ban Public Use of Private Information? 
Those who adhere to the traditional distinction between the pub-
lic and private realm, and the precept that the main danger to privacy 
comes from Big Brother, may suggest that the way to proceed is to 
ban the government from using private databanks.  The 1974 Privacy 
Act already states that the government may not maintain records of 
certain types of personal data for citizens who are not the subjects of 
 
 91 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42. 
 92 See Ellen Mastenbroek, EU Compliance:  Still A ‘Black Hole’?, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1103, 
1103–20 (2006) (examining potential reasons for and solutions to the compliance gap); 
see also Maria Mendrinou, Non-compliance and the European Commission’s Role in  Integration, 
3 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–22 (1996) (advancing a model of the analysis of the Commis-
sion’s approach to non-compliance). 
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investigations;93 it would be relatively simple to add that they also may 
not use existing records in the private sphere.  Still, this would not be 
necessary if Privacy Merchants were limited to trading only in less 
sensitive information, and of little use if this were not the case.  In the 
latter case, such a law would in effect assume that it is acceptable for 
databanks to be used for profit-making—but not for enhancing the 
common good, such as public health and security.  Security these 
days often brings to mind measures taken to prevent terrorist attacks.  
A considerable number of civil liberty advocates hold that these dan-
gers have been exaggerated and hence rights are unduly curtailed.  
However, one should note that security also encompasses criminal 
justice systems, which have utilized databanks to curb criminals.94  
E.  Increased Public Regulation of Sensitive Information? 
A limited approach to curbing Privacy Merchants entails expand-
ing the American patchwork of sectoral laws that limit the violation of 
privacy in one specific area or another.  As Gina Stevens catalogues, 
“[f]ederal laws and regulations extend protection to consumer credit 
reports, electronic communications, federal agency records, educa-
tion records, bank records, cable subscriber information, video rental 
records, motor vehicle records, health information, telecommunica-
tions subscriber information, children’s online information, and cus-
tomer financial information.”95  One could add some more areas to 
this long but seemingly arbitrary list. 
The patchwork of laws can be viewed as based on a rationale that 
treats differently three main areas—private information gleaned from 
public records (e.g. house ownership), relatively sensitive informa-
tion (especially medical and financial), and information that is in ef-
fect deemed less sensitive (most consumer choices).  The patchwork 
can be seen as largely based on the level of sensitivity of the informa-
tion.  Public records, therefore, are open for dissemination online 
because this information was not private in the first place; less sensi-
 
 93 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (2006) (“Each agency that maintains a system of records 
shall . . . maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by 
the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about 
whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an autho-
rized law enforcement activity.”). 
 94 See Amitai Etzioni, DNA Tests and Databases in Criminal Justice:  Individual Rights and the 
Common Good, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 197, 197 (David Lazer ed., 2004) 
(discussing “several issues raised by the extensive use of DNA tests and databases in ad-
vancing public safety”). 
 95 GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41756, PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR PERSONAL 
INFORMATION ONLINE 7 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
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tive information is considered in need of little protection because no 
or little harm is inflicted when it is used by third parties; and sensitive 
information is protected.  And to the extent that one finds that some 
area is not well protected, the argument runs, one can add another 
“patch” of legislation to cover this area. 
The patchwork approach has two serious defects, one often cited 
and one less often noted.  It is widely recognized that the patchwork 
lags woefully behind technological developments in the private sec-
tor.  Thus, legislation attempting to cover uncovered areas is “pro-
posed” and “drafted” but not enacted.  As of mid-2011, one suggested 
bill calls for a federal requirement of a “Do Not Track” option for on-
line advertising.96  Another suggested bill would deal with the relative-
ly new technology of geolocation and mobile privacy.97  The Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) is reportedly working on a regulatory 
framework governing social networking sites, in the wake of high-
profile FTC complaints against Google Buzz and Twitter.98  The FTC 
also plans to target smart phones, a market virtually untouched by 
regulation thus far.99  However, these laws lag considerably behind 
the new technological developments employed by Privacy Merchants, 
and given the current anti-regulatory climate, are unlikely to be 
enacted. 
Less often noted is the problem that the distinction between “sen-
sitive” and “less sensitive” information is much less tight than it seems 
and is likely to further weaken in the near future.  Even if sensitive in-
formation such as medical or financial records is better protected on-
line, less sensitive—and therefore, less protected—information can 
reveal volumes of sensitive information through PVT.  As Marcy Peek 
points out, “the Internet has allowed commercial decision-makers to 
manipulate technology in such a way as to identify persons according 
to a multitude of variables and categories.”100  Unique IP addresses 
are tracked by each page people visit and ad they click on to create a 
 
 96 See Katie Kindelan, John McCain and John Kerry Propose “Online Privacy Bill of Rights,” SOCIAL 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2011, 5:12 PM), http://socialtimes.com/john-mccain-and-john-kerry-
propose-online-privacy-bill-of-rights_b41604 (discussing proposed legislation that would 
govern online privacy). 
 97 Id. 
 98 Tony Romm, Will FTC Get the Funds It Needs to Police Internet?, POLITICO (June 3, 2011, 4:36 
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56134.html (discussing the implica-
tions of congressional allotment of funds to the FTC on the FTC’s potential to expand its 
regulatory powers). 
 99 Id. 
100 Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet:  Espionage and Counterespionage in the In-
ternet Age, 28 VT. L. REV. 91, 94 (2003) (evaluating ways to resist discriminatory marketing 
in cyberspace). 
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detailed portrait of the offline persona.  Peek explains, “[t]hrough 
various means such as ‘cookies,’ Web bugs, and personal data input 
such as zip codes, corporate marketers can obtain a person’s demo-
graphic and other information and ‘tag’ an individual on the basis of 
such information.”101  The individual is then categorized and ranked 
against other users.  The result is “Weblining,” an online version of 
the offline discriminatory practice of “redlining” individuals by deny-
ing or increasing the cost of services based on their demographic.102  
After the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited redlining, which used a 
mortgage applicant’s neighborhood to discriminate along racial 
lines, banks instead used other markers of race as a basis for racial 
discriminations; for instance, which social club people joined or 
church they attended.103  That is, an item of information that is not 
sensitive was used to divine another item meant to be private.  The 
easy access to this type of non-sensitive information online stream-
lines this practice. 
As early as 2000, Business Week highlighted a PVT service offered 
by data broker company Acxiom called “InfoBase Ethnicity System,” 
which matched names against housing, education, and incomes in 
order to identify the unpublicized ethnicity of an individual or 
group.104  More recently, a computer consultant named Tom Owad 
wrote a simple piece of software allowing him to download public 
wish lists that Amazon.com customers post to catalog products they 
plan to buy.105  He downloaded over 250,000 wish lists in one day, 
used Yahoo People Search to identify addresses and phone numbers, 
and published a detailed map showing the locations of people inter-
ested in certain books or themes.  Owad explained, “It used to 
be . . . you had to get a warrant to monitor a person or a group of 
people.  Today, it is increasingly easy to monitor ideas.  And then 
track them back to people.”106  And most people who put simple items 
of information about their preferences on their Facebook profiles are 
 
101 Id. at 95. 
102 Id. at 91–92 n.4. 
103 See id. (explaining the practice and history of redlining). 
104 Marcia Stepanek, Weblining, BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, http://www.businessweek.com/2000/
00_14/b3675027.htm (assessing companies’ practices of using personal data to take ad-
vantage of customers online). 
105 Nicholas Carr, Tracking Is an Assault on Liberty, With Real Dangers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7–8, 
2010, at W1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (arguing for the need for greater privacy 
protection online). 
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unlikely to know that it can be used to divine their personality traits 
with 90% accuracy, as if they had taken personality tests.107 
All this suggests that laws that ban the use of sensitive information 
(without requiring any action by the millions of affected citizens), the 
way medical, financial, and select other records are now protected, 
could be reinforced by banning PVT of protected areas.108  That is, 
the wall that separates more sensitive and less sensitive information 
could be shored up.  (Granted, the debate about what is sensitive and 
what is not would continue.)  That is, the law would ban Privacy Mer-
chants from using information on what one purchases (and other 
such “less” sensitive information) to divine one’s medical condition 
(and other such “more” sensitive information). 
Given the current pro-business and anti-regulatory climate in 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and, it seems, among the voters, 
enactment of such laws in the United States (and their enforcement 
in Europe, if enacted) may seem very unlikely.  The prospect of such 
legislation improves if one notes that they would mainly curb those 
few corporations that make selling private information their main 
lines of business.  Other corporations that merely keep profiles of 
their own customers’ consumeristic preferences would not be affected, 
although their ability to sell this information to other parties might 
be limited (to reduce the risk of PVT), and their advertising would be 
set back because corporations could not use sensitive information in 
their targeting.  Nevertheless, if such laws against PVT used to divine 
sensitive information could be enacted, they would serve as part of a 
system that would shore up privacy to a reasonable level in the future, 
in which I expected PVT otherwise to be much extended.  It is better 
to ban this approach before it catches on widely than try to eradicate 
it once it is widespread. 
CONCLUSION 
 Corporations, especially those that make trading in private infor-
mation their main line of business—the Privacy Merchants—are ma-
jor violators of privacy, and their reach is rapidly expanding.  Given 
that the information these corporations amass and process is also 
 
107 Jennifer Golbeck, Cristina Robles & Karen Turner, Predicting Personality with Social Media, 
CHI 2011, at 253-54 (discussing a study conducted to determine to what extent informa-
tion on an individual’s Facebook page can accurately reflect the individual’s personality). 
108 The EU, China, and India have all begun to take steps that would give individuals more 
control over the data collected by companies.  See Private Data, Public Rules, ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 28, 2012, at 59, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21543489. 
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available to the government, it is no longer possible to protect privacy 
by only curbing the State.  Suggesting that norms have changed and 
that people are now more willing to give up their privacy may be true, 
but only up to a point.  The extent to which private aspects of one’s 
medical and even financial conditions are revealed is unlikely to be 
widely accepted as a social good.  And violation of the privacy of dis-
senters and, more generally, of one’s political and social views (e.g., 
by tracking what people read) has chilling effects, whether or not the 
majority of the public understands the looming implications of un-
bounded profiling of most Americans.  Self-regulation cannot come 
to the rescue because it assumes that individuals can sort out what 
corporations are doing behind the veil of their privacy statements, an 
unrealistic assumption.  Banning the use of less sensitive information 
(in particular, about purchases) for divining more sensitive informa-
tion (e.g., medical)—that is, outlawing Privacy Violating Triangula-
tion—may serve, if combined with laws that add “patches” to the cur-
rent patchwork of legislation, to cover new technological 
developments (e.g., social media).  If such twin progress is possible, 
there will be much less reason to prevent the government from draw-
ing on the databanks maintained by Privacy Merchants, because they 
would be limited to less sensitive information, and PVT of innocent 
Americans would be banned.  Without such progress, one must as-
sume that what is private is also public in two senses of these words:  
that one’s privacy (including sensitive matters) is rapidly corroded by 
the private sector and that whatever it learns is also available to the 
government. 
